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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT COMPANY/ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 1 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS ] 
CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, ] 
Plaintiff in 
Intervention, 
vs. \ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant in \ 
Intervention. ] 
i Case No. 14253 
• . -
r ] 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
_ ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT COMPANY 
NATURE OF CASE 
The nature of case as stated by Appellant is excepted 
to in the following particular: that trial on all aspects of 
the case was not held at the time of the first trial of this 
matter but only the issue of whether or not the land in question 
belonged to the Respondent and that judgment was rendered only 
on the issue of land ownership. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment 
rendered in its favor as against the Appellant. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.,. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent takes exception to the statement of facts 
as set forth by Appellant. 
Respondent sought to abate a nuisance created by the 
County in the construction of a road. Paragraph 10 of its 
Complaint (R-3) states: 
"That said defendant has and is trespassing 
upon plaintiff*s property and has and is 
creating a public way across plaintiff's 
property and as such has created a nuisance, 
which nuisance should be abated and defendant 
restrained and enjoined from further and 
creating said nuisance." 
That the issues tried by the Court on the 19th day 
of May, 1971, the time of the first trial in this matter, was 
to determine whether or not 3200 West was a public road and 
whether or not a resolution passed by the Salt Lake County Board 
of Commissioners on the 25th day of November, 1959, to abandon 
the public streets in what was formerly known as Mountain View 
Subdivision was proper. (R-110-111) It was stipulated by all 
of the parties to the action that in the event that the issues 
tried were determined in favor of the Respondent and against 
Salt Lake County the Respondent would not close off or otherwise 
disturb the flow of traffic or the useage of the rights of way 
claimed by other parties until final adjudication of the matter 
including the contemplated condemnation action or until further 
order of the Court. (R-lll) The County had represented to all 
concerned that in the event that the issues were found in favor 
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of plaintiff an action for condemnation would be commenced by 
the County to acquire the road in question. Following the 
Appeal by the Appellant to the Supreme Court and the rendition 
of the Supreme Court of its decision in favor of the Respondent 
(28 U.2d 139, 499 P.2d 283), the Appellant did nothing and in fact 
refused to bring an action to condemn the property. Thereafter on 
the 6th day of October, 1972, Respondent filed a Motion for an 
Order permitting it to close the roadway, (R-266-267) which 
matter was set for hearing by the Court on the 18th day of 
October, 1972, at the hour of nine o'clock a.m. On that date 
at approximately eight o'clock a.m., one hour before the scheduled 
hearing on the Motion of the Respondent to allow it to close the 
roadway, Salt Lake County moved heavy equipment onto the property 
in question and destroyed the existing roadway. 
Thereafter on the 12th day of December, 1972, the 
Respondent filed a claim against Salt Lake County under the 
Governmental Immunity Act seeking damages for the destruction 
of the road, which Respondent claimed was its property. (R-231-
232) This claim was rejected by the County on January 8, 1973, 
(R-234) thereafter Respondent filed a Motion to File an Amended 
Complaint which the Court authorized Respondent to file (R-235) 
after a hearing. 
Trial was thereafter had on the Supplemental Complaint 
and at the conclusion of the Respondent's case the Appellant 
-3-
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moved to dismiss the Supplemental Complaint on the grounds 
that what had occurred was an intentional trespass by the County 
and that an action for an intentional trespass was not waived 
under the Governmental Immunity Act. (R-260-261) The trial 
court denied the Motion and rendered judgment for the Respondent. 
From this Judgment Appellant appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT REMOVAL OF ROAD WAS A DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION IS NOT FOUNDED UPON THE LAW. 
In Point I of Appellant's argument the County seeks to 
set up a defense that the claim for damages was not waived under 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and cites therefore the 
proposition that the removal of the road was a discretionary 
function of government. It cites therefore the proposition 
that because the County Commissioners met with the County Attorney 
and decided to remove the road that this was a discretionary 
function. 
Under State Statute the County Commission could only 
come to decisions with respect to governmental policy or func-
tioning at general or special meetings. 
Commissioner McClure testified in his deposition that 
this was a special meeting of the County Commissioners (TR-
McClure-22). Commissioner McClure admitted that no minutes of 
this meeting were kept. (TR-McClure-19) 
-4-
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Pursuant to 17-5-7, UCA 1953 a special meeting of the 
County Commission may be ordered by a majority of the Board or 
the Chairman, however, the order must be signed by the members 
or the Chairman calling the meeting and the order must be entered 
on the minutes of the Board. 
Pursuant to 17-5-15, UCA 1953 the County Clerk must 
record all proceedings of the County Commission's meetings. 
Pursuant to 17-5-16, UCA 1953 the Board must cause to be kept a 
minute book in which must be recorded all orders and decisions 
made by the Board and the daily proceedings had at all regular 
and special meetings. This was not done in the instance of the 
Commission reaching a decision to remove the road. 
The County Commission's failure to comply with State 
Law with respect to arriving at the decision to remove this 
road can hardly te said to be a discretionary function on behalf 
of the Commission. Commissioner McClure in his deposition 
stated that the decision to remove the road was not at a formal 
Commission meeting, although he deemed it not to be an executive 
session of the Commission as anyone could have attended if they 
wanted to. No minutes were kept. (TR-McClure-18-19) 
Assuming for the moment that the decision of the 
County Commission was, as the Appellant urges, a basic policy 
decision, still the fact that the County's employees trespassed 
and destroyed property in carrying out this policy is the minis-
terial implementation of the basic policy and as such does not 
have the cloak of immunity. 
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In the case of Johnson vs. State, 73 Ca. Rptr. 240, 
447 P.2d 352, a case cited as authority by the Supreme Court of 
Utah in Carroll vs. State of Utah, 27 U.2d 384, 496 P.2d 888, 
the California Appellant Court observed: 
"These cited cases establish the principal 
that, although a basic policy decision (such 
as standards for parole) may be discretionary 
and hence warrant Governmental Immunity, subse-
quent ministerial actions in the implementation of 
that basic decision still must face case by 
case adjudication on the question of negligence." 
The trial court found that the County through its 
County Employees was negligent in failing to ascertain who, as 
a matter of law, was the owner of the roadway that they intended 
to destroy and that they negligently destroyed the roadway which 
was as a matter of law the property of the plaintiff. This was 
done on the operational level of government, that is, at the 
level of the County Road and Bridges and its employees who 
trespassed upon the property of the Respondent to destroy the 
roadway. (R-2 67) The Court further found that destruction of 
the Respondent's property was not the exercise or the performance 
of a discretionary function. (R-2 67) 
The discretionary function, if any, was the decision 
of the County Commissioners to construct a new roadway adjoining 
the existing road and the general determination to remove the 
old roadway. (TR-McClure-15) A new road was constructed 
abutting on the west edge of Respondent's property - a lateral 
move of 33 feet to the west. 
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How the old roadway was to be in fact removed or 
destroyed became an operational function of government. That 
is, the securing of permission to enter onto land of another 
and permission to remove the roadway, the property of another. 
This, the County through its employees negligently failed to do. 
The Supreme Court of Utah had put the County on notice 
that the land in question was the land of the Respondent. 
Therefore, the entry upon that land for the purposes of removing 
property thereon was cleanly a trespass. The failure of the 
County Commission to find out, through its employees who in fact 
owned the roadway was a negligent act on the operational level 
again. It cannot be said to be discretionary as to who owned 
the roadway or to find out who owned the roadway. Certainly it 
is discretionary to find out what your legal rights are, but then 
anything that one does contains certain elements of discretion. 
Carroll vs. State Road Commission, (op cit.). The failure to 
ascertain who the owner was or the failure to obtain permission 
to enter onto property of someone else was negligence on the 
operational level. 
It has been pointed out in numerous cases that for a 
decision to be discretionary it is necessary for the decision 
to involve a "basic governmental policy, program or objective". 
King vs. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239, 525 P.2d228, 232. It 
is submitted that one of the functions of County Government is 
to supply roadways within the County. Supplying the roadways 
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does not entail the trespassing upon property of another and the 
destruction of property, located thereon. In the instant case 
it may well be said that the County did have the discretionary 
function as to whether or not to construct a new roadway adjacent 
to the land of the Respondent, but it can hardly to said that 
the discretionary function went to the entry upon the land of 
the Respondent to destroy a roadway located thereon. As stated 
in the King vs. City of Seattle, case (op cit.) at p. 233 of 
Pacific citation: 
"Immunity for'discretionary activities' serves 
no purpose except to assure that courts refuse 
to pass judgment on policy decisions in the 
province of coordinate branches of government. 
Accordingly, to be entitled to immunity the 
State must make a showing that such a policy 
decision consciously blancing risks and 
advantages took place. The fact that an employee 
normally engages in 'discretionary activity' 
is irrelevant if, in a given case the employee 
did not render a considered decision." 
In applying a standard of a consciously balancing 
risk and advantages one has to ask in the instant case just what 
risks and advantages were balanced by the Salt Lake County 
Commission in determining to trespass upon the land of the 
Respondent and remove a roadway which they had constructed 
some years previously. This served no usefull purpose whatso-
ever so far as Salt Lake County Government was concerned in 
that under the law and the findings of the Court, the roadway 
belonged to the Respondent. There was no showing that it was 
necessary to remove this road before a new roadway could be 
constructed. There was no showing that the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office had advised the Appellant as to the possibilities 
- f t -
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of further damage by the trespass onto the property of the 
Respondent to remove the roadway or to the determination as to 
just who the roadway belonged to in the first place. 
In the King vs. City of Seattle case ( op cit.) it 
was found that the City acting through its Board of Public Works 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and without foundation in 
law and that such conduct could not be asserted as discretionary 
function of Government. This is the same situation as we have 
in the instant case although the Court did not find that the 
actions of Salt Lake County were arbitrary or capricious. How-
ever , the County does assert, although it is careful in its 
language to play down that it "intentionally trespassed" upon 
the land of the Respondent, which would bring it within the 
realm of an arbitrary and capricious act, still the County does 
fall back to this proposition on page 6 of their brief. 
The case law of Utah has cited with approval the 
California cases, which cases were likewise cited with approval 
in the Washington case of King vs. City of Seattle, (op cit.). 
It is submitted that under no stretch of the imagination could 
the acts of Salt Lake County be deemed to be discretionary in 
the facts of this case. 
How "considered" could the determination of the Salt 
Lake County Commission have been when it did not even follow 
the statutory commandment that minutes of its meeting would be 
-9-
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duly recorded. The decision was of such a nature as it did not 
want to have the public know that it had considered the invasion 
of a person's property and the destruction of property as a 
discretionary function of local government. 
POINT II 
THE ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT'S AGENTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN DESTROY-
INT RESPONDENT'S PROPERTY. 
Appellant asserts as its second defense to the actions 
of its agents and employees that their conduct was intentional 
and that therefore this falls within the exclusions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act (63-30-11 (2) UCA 1953, as amended). 
The law of Utah, which needs no citation of authority, 
is that the findings of fact of the trial court will not be 
disturbed unless there is no creditable evidence upon which such 
findings could be predicated. 
In the instant case the trial court in its Memorandum 
Decision(R-260-261) found that the actions of the Appellant 
was an act of negligence and was not a willfull prespass. The 
Court in its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R-265-268) 
specifically spelled out that the acts of the Appellant were 
founded on negligence and not willfull trespass. In the 
deposition of Commissioner McClure (TR-McClure-12-12) the Commis-
sioner admits that nothing was mentioned by the County Attorney 
at the time of the meeting with the three County Commissioners 
that the roadway in fact belonged to the Respondent. This was 
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negligence on the part of the County Attorney in not properly 
advising the Commissioners as to just who in fact owned the roadwa 
The law in Utah is clear that buildings or other structures 
placed on or affixed to the soil become part of the land and 
belong to its owner, Reimann vs. Baumy 115 U. 147, 203 P.2d 387, 
41 Am Jur 2d 480, Improvements, §2. See also annotation 130 ALR 
1034, Property Rights in Respect of Building, or Other Structures 
Placed Upon Anothers Land Through Mistake as to Boundary or 
Location, 
It is submitted that the Salt Lake County Attorney 
should have been aware of the Occupying Claimants Act, 57-6-1, 
UCA 1953. It is admitted by Appellant that it did not seek to 
avail itself of the Occupying Claimants Act but proceeded forward 
to carve out its own remedies in spite of the law. It is 
submitted, and the trial court so found, that such conduct was 
negligence. 
POINT III 
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE DEFENSE OF INTENTIONAL TRESPASS 
WOULD DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF EQUAL PROTECTIONS OF THE LAW. 
Appellant falls back on the time honored defense of 
Governmental Immunity in seeking a reversal of this matter on 
the theory that the actions of the Appellant were either discre-
tionary functions or were a intentional trespass. 
With respect to the defense of the intentional trespass 
it is submitted that if the government is entitled to take a 
-11-
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person's property, destroy the same and to deprive the lawful 
owner thereof of its use and enjoyment that such action is 
unconstitutional as it violates the Equal Protections Clause of 
§1 14th Amendment, Constitution of the United States. 
The Constitution provided: 
"No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
The Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-11 (2) provided that the 
Government is immune for its actions done intentionally, i.e. 
intentional trespass but that if the action done is done 
negligently then the government stands liable for such negli-
gent conduct. 
A citizen who is agrieved by the actions of a govern-
mental agency, if that agency acts negligently, has recourse 
to the Courts. On the other hand if that same governmental 
agency acts intentionally the agrieved person has no redress to 
the Courts. Therefore, it is submitted, it is clear and without 
plausible argument, that certain classes of persons have been 
denied "equal protections" that is, they may not have their 
wrongs redressed in courts because "governmental immunity" 
has not been waived as to them although governmental immunity 
has been waived as to other classes and persons. 
The net effect of the governmental immunity act of 
Utah is that certain citizens have been denied access to the 
-12-
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courts for redress of their wrongs. This in and of itself is 
a violation of Article 1 §11 Constitution of Utah which states: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay." 
Since the beginning of our country, the ancient and 
"venerable" Doctrine of Governmental Immunity has plagued the 
individual citizen with respect to the redressing of his rights 
and grievances against an offending government. In using the 
word "venerable" the writer of this brief uses the same with 
tongue in cheek as the doctrine is outdated, tyrannical and 
not predicated upon sound principles of justice in a modern 
society. 
Utah in its case decisions has consistently followed 
the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity. In the case of Cobia vs. 
Roy City, 12 U.2d, 375, 366 P.2d 986, at footnote 1 thereof the 
cases in which adopt and follow governmental immunity are 
annotated. Utah in following the Doctrine of Governmental 
Immunity has failed to keep pace with the times. The reason for 
following Governmental Immunity was set forth in the case of 
Bingham vs. Board of Education of Ogden City, 118 U. 582, 223 P.2d 
432, wherein Justice Latimer stated: 
"While law writers, editors and judges 
have criticized and disapproved the foregoing 
»13-
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Doctrine of Governmental Immunity as illogical 
and unjust the weight of precedent of decided 
cases supports the general rule and we prefer 
not to disregard a principle so well established 
without statutory authority. We therefore, 
T adopt the rule of the majority and hold that 
school boards can not be held liable for ordinary 
negligent acts." 
It is submitted that the weight of authority no longer 
preponderates towards the maintenance of the Doctrine of 
Governmental Immunity. The following are but few of the more 
modern well reasoned, rational and equitable minded cases which 
have held that Governmental Immunity does not serve the purposes 
for which it was originally intended nor does it amorleate the 
unjust treatment of citizens. Hargrove vs. Coco Beach, (1957 
Fla.) 96 S.2d 130, 50 ALR 2d 1193; Friedman vs. Farmington Township 
School District, 40 Mich. App. 197, 198 N.W. 2d 785, Reich vs. 
State Highway Department, 170 N.W. 2d 267, Zipster vs. Pound, 
(1972) 67 Misc 152, 329 N.Y.2d 494; Ayala vs. Philadelphia Board 
of Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877; Kitto vs. Minota Park 
District, (1974) 224 N.W.2d 795; Barker vs. City of Santa Fe, 
47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480; Long vs. City of Weirton, et al., 
(1975 W.Va.) S.E.2d Merrill vs. City of Manchester, 
(1974 N.H.) 322 A.2d 378. Governmental Immunity has been struck 
down or given only limited existence in decisions from California, 
Idaho, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, Hawaii, West Virginia, Kansas and other states. 
-14-
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A justification giving the government the right to 
intentionally trespass upon ones property with immunity is to 
vest the government with such powers that no modern logical 
mind could justify such action under the constitution of either 
the United States or of Utah. 
The trial courd did not find it necessary to determine 
the constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act by its 
findings that the actions of the Appellant were negligent and 
not intentional. However, if the court should find the conduct 
of the Appellant intentional then such conduct is unconstitu-
tional. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE 
FILING OF A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT. 
Under Rule 15 (d) U.R.C.P., it is provided that a 
party upon notice may file a supplemental proceeding "setting 
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened 
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented". 
The facts of this case are that the County after the 
Supreme Court of Utah had ruled in the first appeal of this 
matter that the County had trespassed it then once again entered 
onto the property of the Respondent and destroyed property 
located thereon. This is just what Rule 15 (d) is all about. 
Appellant in its brief seems to state that supplemental 
proceedings are not allowed to reopen a case. In the instant 
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case there was never an adjudication of all of the rights of 
the parties. The only issue tried to the trial court at the 
time of the first trial was whether or not the land in question 
belonged to the County or to the Respondent. It was stipulated 
by the parties in the pre-trial order (R-ll) that if the issue 
to be tried of who owned the roa in question was decided in 
favor of the plaintiff it would not close off or otherwise disturb 
the flow of traffic or the useage of the rights of way claimed 
by the other parties nor in any way interfer with the utilities 
located on the right of way until "final adjudication of the 
matter, including the contemplated condemnation action or until 
further order of the Court, the plaintiff not waiving any claims 
or rights for the continued useage of the road by the parties". 
Such a stipulation can hardly be said to be a final adjudication 
of the case when it went to the Supreme Court and that the 
decision thereon closed the case. The conduct of the Appellant 
in further trespassing upon the land of the Respondent and the 
destruction of property located thereon is a proper subject 
matter of a Supplemental Complaint pursuant to Rule 15 (d) U.R.C.P. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING DAMAGES FOR THE DESTRUC-
TION OF ITS PROPERTY. 
Appellant seeks to foreclose Respondent from obtaining 
damages on the theory of its "self help". Self help being in the 
instant case its unilateral decision to enter onto the property 
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of the Respondent and to destroy improvements belonging to the 
Respondent, located thereon. It is interesting to note that 
this destruction took place one-half hour before the Court was 
to hear Respondent's Motion For an Order allowing Respondent to 
close off said roadway. This was not a Motion to Remove the 
road but a Motion to Allow Respondent to close the road, the 
Respondent having asserted and having been adjudicated the owner 
of the roadway in question. Point III of Appellant's brief is 
without merit. 
POINT VI 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT HAVE EQUITABLE RIGHT IN THE ROAD IN 
QUESTION. 
In Point IV of Appellant's brief the County seeks to 
assert that it had an equitable right in the road. The County 
then takes the inconsistent position that it failed to avail 
itself of its remedies under 57-6-1, et seq. UCA 1953. Under 
the law this was the County's sole remedy. It elected not to 
avail itself of the law or, conversely Salt Lake County's 
Attorneys Office was negligent in not advising the County 
Commissioners of the availability of this law. Now the County 
seeks equity. The Doctrine of Clean Hands is applicable in this 
matter. The old saying those who seek equity must do equity 
certainly has applicability in the instant case where the County 
deliberately built a road on property belonging to the Respondent, 
even though the Respondent advised the Appellant not to build 
the road that the Appellant then entered onto the property of 
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the Respondent and destroyed the road even after having been 
advised to stop such destruction. (R-297) The County now as a 
means of attempting to get out of its legal responsibilities 
attempts to invoke the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity claiming 
discretionary function or intentional trespass. Is this equity? 
Does the County seek equity? Has the County done equity? 
Appellant's Point IV of its brief is without merit. 
POINT VII 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE NOT EXCESSIVE OR IMPROPERLY MEASURED. 
Appellant did not cross examine Respondent's witnesses 
nor did Appellant seek to show through its own evidence the 
measure of damages. 
The Court, based upon the evidence adduced at the trial 
properly assessed damages based on the evidence before it. 
Such an assessment was not arbitrary or beyond what reasonable 
minds would accept. DeVos vs. Noble, 13 U.2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, 
Cert Den. 83 S.Ct. 37, 371 U.S. 821, 9 L.Ed. 2d 61; Super Tire 
Market, Inc., vs. Rollings, 18 U.2d 122, 417 P.2d 132. 
Arnold Machinery Company vs. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 
11 U.2d 246, 357 P.2d 496, Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea Company, 
5 U.2d 187, 299 P.2d 622. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that the Respondent is 
entitled to the damages awarded by the trial Court. It is further 
respectfully submitted that this case stands as a hall mark of 
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arbitrary, capricious governmental intermeddling with the rights 
of its citizens. The Respondent was put to the task of going 
through a trial, and appeal to assert ownership of its lands, 
and to demonstrate the trespass of the Appellant. Following this, 
the Appellant, again seeking self help refused to condemn the 
land of the Respondent that it had taken and then negligently 
set about to again trespass upon the land and to destroy Respon-
dent's property without availing itself of the Courts and the 
normal judicial process by which the rest of the citizens of 
the state are governed. 
The trial court did not err in granting to Respondent 
fair and just damages for the destruction of its property. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Responde 
Roy S. Ludlow Investment Compan 
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